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September 1976 Risø Report No. 348 
FAUNET: A Program Package for Evaluation of 
Fault Trees and Networks 
by 
O. Plata and J. V. Olsen 
Research Establishment Risø 
Electronics Department 
Abstract 
A program package for the evaluation of fault trees and networks is 
described. The package, written in standard Fortran, is primarily de-
signed for use on a minicomputer. Special efforts were therefore made to 
minimize storage space requirements. 
The package contains programs for checking the fault tree input data 
for logical consistency and for providing various graphical representations 
of the tree. Furthermore, it contains programs for calculating minimal 
cut/path sets of the tree. A new technique automatically prunes the fault 
tree before the minimal set calculation. This pruning has in practice 
proved to considerably reduce computer time and storage space require-
ments. 
The probability program calculates the availability of the system at 
various time points from the minimal sets and from failure and repair data 
for the components. The network program finds all path sets in a directed 
or undirected network where both links and nodes may fail. The path sets 
represent the structure function of the network. The minimal cut sets are 
found by subjecting the structure function to the minimal set programs. 
The terminal availabilities can be calculated by using the probability pro-
gram. 
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Fault tree analysis (FTA) has become an indispensable tool for the 
reliability and safety analysis of complex systems. The basic concepts, 
techniques and applications are described in several papers and reports, 
«. g. O - 3). The state of the art is well represented by the contributions 
in (4) and (5). 
Apart from being a valuable graphical tool for communication, FTA 
allows a quantitative assessment of system reliability and availability. In 
this respect, its applications are limited to systems where time sequence 
is not important, or at least of so little significance that it can be neglected. 
For systems where time sequence i s essential, e.g. for systems where a 
passive standby i s switched in when the main system fails, other techniques 
such as cause-consequence analysis (6, 7) are more appropriate. Even for 
systems of this kind, FTA often plays an important role in solving a part of 
the problem. For the example above, a FTA could be used to obtain the 
distribution of time to failure for the main system or the unavailability of 
the standby. 
Computer programs for the analytic evaluation of fault trees are by now 
standard tools in the analysis of complex industrial systems. Many of the 
programs have been described in the literature (8-11). Most of them are 
written for large computers with ample in-core memory space. In this 
report we describe how procedures for fault tree evaluation can be im-
plemented on a minicomputer (an 8K PDP8 under 06/8). This is made 
possible by an new storage-space-saving implementation of the Fuss ell 
Vesely (12) algorithm for calculating minimal sets, and by the development 
of a technique for automatic pruning (or modularization) of fault trees. 
Although the programs have been developed for use on a minicomputer be-
cause of its advantages with regard to interactive analysis and flexibility in 
handling of data files, they can, with minor modifications, be implemented 
on any computer that accepts FORTRAN. 
The programs of the package fall into four main categories. In section 1 
we describe the format of the fault tree input data and the programs under 
the common label TREE. The first of these programs performs various 
error checks on the input data. The function of the other programs is to 
provide graphical fault tree representations from the input data so that the 
tree can be represented in a form in which it is most easily surveyed. 
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Section 2 is concerned with the second category of programs under the 
general heading CUT. The function of these programs is to make a top-
down calculation of minimal cut/path sets. One of the programs performs 
a pruning of the fault tree before it is subjected to the minimal set calcu-
lation. For most fault trees, the pruning will much reduce the number 
and/or the order of the minimal sets, thus making it possible to calculate . 
reliability parameters with an increased accuracy in a shorter time. For . 
the fault tree used as the main example in this report, pruning reduces the 
number of minimal cut sets from 11 934 to 48. 
Section 3 describes the UNA programs for reliability and availability 
calculations from the minimal sets and from failure, repair and test data 
for the components of the system. The programs accept components with 
either constant failure probabilities or exponentially distributed failure 
times. Repair times are either constant or exponentially distributed. 
Specifications of test intervals are also allowed. 
Throughout sections I - 3 the fault tree for the Dresden-3 AC emergency 
power system is used as an example. It is taken from the report by Garrick, 
Gekler, et al. (13) where it was used to demonstrate a Monte Carlo code. 
Vesely (14) also used it. As a second example of a calculation of minimal 
cut sets, we use the fault tree for the High Pressure Injection System 
(HPIS) from Wash-1400. appendix 2, (15). 
Network reliability has been extensively treated in the literature. 
Although of a general nature, much of the work has been aimed at com-
munication networks. Surveys of work in this field are given in (16) and (17). 
Methods for finding all paths between two nodes in a network have been 
presented by Fu and Yau (18), and Kroft (1 9). The terminal unavailability, 
i. e. the probability that the two nodes do not communicate at a given time 
point, can then be calculated as the probability that all paths between the 
two nodes are disconnected. 
Jensen and Bellmore (20) developed an algorithm for determining all 
minimal cut sets for the communication between two nodes. The bounding 
technique of Esary and Proschan (21) was used to provide a lower limit to 
the terminal availability. 
Nelson, Batts and Beadles (22) developed a method for the enumeration 
of all minimal cut sets between two nodes provided that the path sets were 
given. From either path or cut sets the terminal availability can be calcu-
lated by using the inclusion-exclusion technique (23). 
Other methods for the calculation of various network reliability param-
eters are given in references 24-28. 
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The network program in the FAUNET package is described in section 4. 
For a network where links (components) and/or nodes can fail, the program 
TIENET calculates all paths between two specified nodes. The paths rep-
resent the success tree of the network. The Dual of this, the fault tree, is 
written on an output file. By subjecting the fault tree to a calculation with 
the CUT programs, all the minimal cut sets of the network can be found. 
If failure and repair distributions of links and nodes are known, the terminal 
unavailability can be found by using the UNA programs. 
The network program can handle networks with both uni- and bi-direc-
tional links. 
In section 4 the program is applied to two examples taken from refer-
ences 20 and 22. 
1. INPUT DATA AND TREE PROGRAMS 
The format of the input data for the fault trees is illustrated by the 
data for the fault tree for the Dresden-3 system. The data are shown in 
fig. 1. They were obtained from appendix E in(1 3)where the tree structure 
was given in terms of logical FORTRAN statements. The first line in the 
file contains the name of the fault tree (FORTRAN format A6). Each of the 
following lines defines a gate in the tree in the form: gate type - gate num-
ber - number of gate inputs - list of gate inputs. The FORTRAN format is 
Al, 2014. The gate type is specified .is + or O for an OR gate, and as X or 
A for an AND gate. Events are indexed from 1 to 999 and gates are in-
dexed from 1000 to 2000. The order in which the gates are defined in the 
file is immaterial. The $ sign in the last line denotes the end of the file. 
For convenience in writing input files, the data can be written in free 
format with commas as delimiters. A program, FREE, then reads the 
input data in free format and produces an output file of data for either the 
Primal or the Dual tree in fixed format. The Dual tree is obtained from 
the Primal by converting AND gates to OR gates and vice versa, and by 
letting the basic events denote their logical inverses. 
The TREE package consists of 4 programs: 
TREECH, the error checking program, reads the input data in fixed 
format and lists the number of OR and AND gates and the number of basic 
events. It also produces a list of basic events and gates together with the 
the number of times they occur in the tree. It checks the tree to see if it 
is connected and to see if there are multiple definitions of a gate. If further-
more checks the tree for loops. Finally, it calculates the number of B1CS 
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(Boolean Indicated Cut Sets (2)) and the maximum length of these for each 
gate. Apart from checking the data for errors, the functions performed by 
TREECH are helpful in assessing the size of the problem in the following 
calculation of minimal cut sets. As an option, the functions of TREECH 
can be performed on the Dual tree instead of the Primal. The information 
obtained is then pertinent to the path sets (tie sets) of the fault tree. 
Figures 2 and 3, respectively, show the output produced by TREECH 
for the Primal and the Dual versions of the fault tree Dresden-3. The 
asterisks in the last line of fig. 2 just indicate that the number of BICS 
exceeded the format of the output statement. The number will be about 
33 • 101 2 . 
TREEIN, the input module for the graphical programs, accepts input 
data in fixed format. The program asks for a specification of a top event 
(Gate). As a default it takes the gate in the second line of the input data 
(gate 1060 in fig. 1). With the selected top event as an ancestor, the program 
orders gates and events according to the generation in which they occur, 
and it allocates each component (gates and events) an initial set of coordi-
nates for its position in the graph. 
The structural description i s stored in COMMON. Overflow data are 
left on a file for processing in a later pass. 
TREEBA, the balancing module, accepts the tree description in 
COMMON from TREEIN and calculates new x-coordinates for positioning 
gates and events to give, as far as possible, a well balanced picture. 
Initially, all components are placed as far to the left as possible. The 
tree is squeezed along the left edge of the picture. The balancing is an 
iterative process, moving the components from their initial left positions 
to the right on the plane. In a series of upwards and downwards scans the 
algorithm tries to establish a position of any gate name (output) and the 
inputs to the gate so that the output is placed above the central input, in the 
case of an odd number of inputs, or in the middle of the two central inputs 
in the case ol an even number of inputs. The inputs are moved in the down-
going scan, and the outputs in the upgoing. The components do not move 
more than allowed by their neighbours. Only movements toward the right 
are permitted. 
This process is repeated until no further movements occur. The result 
is still kept in COMMON while the output module is called. 
TREEOU, the output module, draws the structure on the lineprinter, 
specifying gates by type, number and connection to inputs. 
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If there are more data than allowed on one sheet, the control i s given 
back to TREEIN for another pass to evaluate the next part of the tree from 
the data stored in the overflow file. 
If a gate occurs more than once in the input data, the subtree corre-
sponding to this gate i s developed the first time it appears as input (i. e. as 
near to the top gate as possible). The next time it occurs, e. g. in another 
branch or in a later generation, it is not expanded into its subtree but only 
referred to by the gate number. It i s . nevertheless, possible to force the 
subtree corresponding to the gate to be "pressed" downwards in the tree by 
adding an extra line in the input data above the actual gate definition. This 
line should contain the gate number with no inputs. As gate type an * may 
be used to indicate that it i s a subtree. 
If a gate i s "pressed" out of the tree in this way it will be processed 
separately and drawn on a separate sheet (e. g. gate 1055 in fig. 4). 
2. CUT PROGRAMS 
The package consists of 7 programs: 
CUTSET Input and gate contraction 
CUTUP Factoring, or modularisation, (bottom-up analysis) 
CUTGO Evaluation of minimal cut sets 
CUTOFL Overflow handling 
CUTRED Inter-block reduction 
CUTOUT Result calculation 
CUTEV Expansion of factorized minimal sets (optional) 
Each of the first 6 programs calls the next in sequence by CHAIN. 
CUTSET reads the input data in fixed format and asks for the highest 
order of sets wanted in the result together with a specification of the top 
event. As a default it uses the gate defined in the second line of the input 
file. The user may specify whether he requires a cut set or a tie set (path 
set) calculation of the fault tree. The program then contracts subsequent 
gates of the same type in the tree into a single gate, so that the tree struc-
ture becomes an alternating sequence of OR and AMD gates. The data that 
are stored in COMMON are now ready for the next step: 
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CUTUP performs a bottom-up analysis by identifying primitive factors, 
i. e. a pair of basic events always occurring together in the same types of 
gate. Such a pair is replaced by a dummy event, here called a "complex 
event", while a description of this factor in terms of its type and inputs is 
written at the top of the result file. If, in the next pass, two complex events 
(or a complex event and a basic event) always appear as a pair in the same 
types of gate, they are combined into a new complex event and so on. This 
process continues until no more pairs are found. For each pass CUTUP 
prints "FACTORIZE ". Finally CUTUP calls: 
CUTGO, which identifies itself by the message "EVALUATE". CUTGO 
performs the actual evaluation of the cut sets/path sets. The evaluation is 
based on the Fussell Veseley algorithm (12). A description of the algorithm 
together with an application to a simple fault tree is also contained in (23). 
All operations in CUTGO are performed in a single one-dimensional 
array placed in COMMON. The first part of the array contains the descrip-
tion of the factorized fault tree. Each gate is specified by type and inputs 
(gates, basic and/or complex events). For each gate there is a pointer to 
the array element where the information about the next gate begins. The 
remaining part of the array is reserved for cut set expansions. From now 
on this part is called the buffer. 
The evaluation starts by replacing the top event with a list of its inputs. 
The list is placed in the buffer preceded by a pointer to indicate its length. 
The program then looks up the first gate in the buffer and expands it ac-
cording to the Fussell Veseley algorithm. An AND gate will be expanded 
into a single and, in most cases, longer list of inputs. An OR gate will 
usually give rise to several new lists of the same length as the old one. 
The resulting lists are added to the lists already in the buffer together with 
pointers and the array elements which have been occupied by the old list 
are set free. 
Every time the buffer is filled, i. e. no more free space is available at 
the end of the buffer, CUTGO performs a garbage collection to retrieve the 
free elements. 
When no more free space is available, CUTGO enters the minimization 
phase. Here all cut sets, whether fully evaluated or not, are sorted ac-
cording to size and compared for removal of all redundant sets. The 
message "MINIMIZE" is printed. 
If some cut sets are removed, the program goes back to garbage col-
lection followed by further expansions. If not, the overflow handler is 
called. 
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If the evaluation is finished (no cut sets contain gates as inputs) the 
overflow handler is called too. 
CUTOFL. the overflow handler, starts with the message "OVERFLOW". 
This module extracts all partially evaluated sets as well as sets of order 
higher than that specified by the user as maximum. The sets are extracted 
from the array in COMMON and added to an overflow file on backing store. 
The remaining sets art then added tc the result file. 
Finally, if there are any overflow data of lower order than the maximal, 
they are loaded into the buffer and control i s given back to CUTGO to perform 
further evaluations. 
If there are no more overflow data, or all the overflow data are of 
higher order than that specified as maximum, and all cut sets in the buffer 
have been fully evaluated, the control is given to: 
CUTRED, which performs an inter-block minimization between the 
blocks in the result file that have been produced by several passes between 
CUTGO and CUTOFL. The message "REDUCE" is printed. CUTRED 
finally sorts all minimal sets in the result file according to order and 
input events. 
The result file is a file containing: 
1) calculation type (CUTSET/TIESET) and fault tree name, 
2) a list of factors (definitions of complex events), 
3) all minimal cut sets / t ie sets found with order less than or equal to 
the maximal required. 
CUTOUT is the final program that scans the result file and calculates 
the number of minimal sets of any order for the factorized tree, as well as 
the number of minimal sets for the original tree. 
CUTEV, an independent program, may be called optionally. It accepts 
the result file as input, and as output it produces a list of the minimal sets 
for the original tree. 
Examples 
Example 1, Dresden-3 
Figure 5 shows the questions and the messages printed by the computer 
and the answers typed by the operator under the execution of the Dresden-3 
fault tree. The first line is a run command to the operating system. In the 
next lines the operator specifies that he requires a cut set calculation on the 
input data existing as a disk (DSK) file DRESD3. He makes certain that the 
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cut sets are calculated to any order by typing 999 as answer to the question 
about the highest order wanted. As a default, the computer selects gate 
1060 as top event. 
After having made several passes through minimization, overflow and 
evaluate stages, the output module CUTOUT prints the number and the order 
of the minimal cut sets for the factorized tree and for the original tree. For 
the Dresden-3 fault tree the modularization technique causes a reduction of 
the total number of minimal cut sets from 11 934 to 48. 
The result file is listed in fig. 6. The first line contains the name of 
the fault tree together with a specification of the type (cut/tie) of the sets. 
The following lines contain the definitions of the complex events, which are 
indexed from 999 and downwards; -1 indicates an OR gate, -2 an AND gate. 
The second line in the file thus shows that complex event no. 999 is an OR 
gate with the basic events 50 and 51 as inputs. 
The 48 minimal cut sets follow after a mark (-959 here). The first 
number in each line is just an indication of the number of data in the line. 
If the complex events in these cut sets were expanded (e. g. by CUTEV) 
according to their definitions, the 11 934 minimal sets for the original tree 
would be obtained. 
Figures 7-8 show the calculation of the minimal tie sets for the Dresden-3 
fault tree. The complex events in fig. 8 are, of course, identical to those in 
fig. 6, except for the fact that OR gates in the Primal tree are converted to 
AND gates in the Dual tree. The total number of path sets are 8 both for the 
factorized tree and for the original tree, but they are of considerably lower 
order in the factorized tree. 
Example 2, HPIS 
Figures 9-13 show the input data, the outputs of the checking program, 
and the minimal cut set programs for the fault tree of the High Pressure 
Injection System taken from appendix 2 of Wash-1400. The 81 79 minimal 
cut sets of the original tree are reduced to 52 minimal sets in the factorized 
tree. 
It was not possible to calculate all the minimal path sets of the HPIS 
fault tree. As seen from fig, 11, there are 248832 BICS (or rather BIPS, 
Boolean Indicated Path Sets) of maximal length 1 74. The number, and size, 
of the actual minimal path sets, even for the factorized tree, exceeded the 
capacity of the PDP8 minicomputer. 
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3. PROBABILITY PROGRAMS. UNA 
The UNA programs calculate system unavailability from the minimal 
sets of the factorized tree when failure, repair and test data are given for 
the components of the system. The components are assumed to be statisti-
cally independent. 
In their present form the programs accept exponentially distributed 
failure times and repair times that are either constant or exponentially 
distributed. They also accept constant failure probabilities for components 
with a fixed probability of failure per demand. For the purpose of treating 
components where failures are only detected at tests, the programs further-
more allow the specification of constant test intervals. 
In order to minimize the requirements to core storage space, the 
programs perform a dynamic allocation of storage space similar to that 
used in the CUT programs. Only a single one-dimensional array is used. 
In the following the array that is placed in COMMON is called the internal 
buffer. 
UNAVA1, the main program, administrates the subroutine calls. It 
first calls: 
UNAIN1, which reads the basic failure, repair and test data from the 
input data file. The information is stored in the internal buffer. The 
program then reads the complex events (i. e. type, number and inputs) from 
the cut/tie set file, the result file from the CUT programs. This infor-
mation is also placed in the internal buffer. Finally, the program reads 
the minimal sets from the same file and stores them in a direct access 
disk file, the external buffer. The control is then given back to the main 
program which asks the operator to specify the time points at which he 
requires the calculations performed and the number of inclusion-exclusion 
terms , he needs in the calculation of the system unavailability. The 
main program then calls: 
UNASU1, which calculates the unavailability of the components from 
their failure data. If a component has an exponential failure distribution 
with failure rate X and exponential repair distribution with mean repair 
time r, the unavailability as a function of time t i s given by the well known 
expression 
u<t» . T ^ - n - . - P * ' / ^ , 
when the component was operating at time 0. 
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If the component has an exponential failure distribution with failure 
rate X and constant repair time r the unavailability i s given by £9) 
[t/r] 
j=o 
where [ t / r ] denotes the greatest integer contained in t /r . 
For a component with an exponential failure distribution 1 - e~ and 
constant repair time r, and subjected to periodic tests with a test interval 
T, so that failures are revealed and repaired at tests only, the point un-
availability i s easily found to be given by the expression: 
u(t) 
1 - e - U 
(1-o) ( l -e ' U '* + o 
(1 -o)(1 - e " U , ) 




t < T 
t * T 
t ? T 
and V = r 
and V ) r 
-XT * 
here t' = t modulo T, and a - 1 -e . It is assumed that r * T. 
After having calculated the unavailabilities of all the components the 
program stores the results in the internal buffer and the next subroutine 
is called. 
UNACP1 calculates the probabilities of the complex events from the 
probabilities of the basic events, i. e. the unavailabilities of the components. 
If the complex event 1 is an OR gate with input events (basic or complex) 
m and n, the probability p, oi the complex event is given by 
Pi * P™ + Pn - P™ * P« » r l r m r n *m r n ' 
where p and p are the probabilities of the statistically independent input 
events. For an AND gate the corresponding expression is given by 
Pi * Pm ' Pn ' 
Having calculated the probabilities of all complex events, the program 
stores the results in the internal buffer and the main program calls: 
UNAFI1, which performs the final calculation of system unavailability 
from the minimal sets of the factorized tree and from the probabilities of 
basic and complex events. 
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The program calculates the probability of the union of the minimal sets 
by using the inclusion-exclusion technique(23). In its presentform the 
program is able to include the three first terms in the expansion. 
Example, Dresden-3 
The failure data for the Dresden-3 fault tree are taken from table 2.10 
of the Holms and Narver report (13). Figure 14 shows the data written as a 
free format input file for the UNA programs. Each line in the file consists 
of component number, calculation type, number of succeeding data inputs, 
failure data, mean repair time and test interval. 
Generally, calculation type 1 denotes a constant failure probability; 
type 2, exponential failure and repair distributions; while types 3 and 4 
denote exponential failure distribution and constant repair time. In the case 
of type 4, failures are only detected at tests. 
Failure data are either constant probabilities (calculation type s 1), or 
failure rates. In both cases the program multiplies the number in the input 
file by 10"6 . 
In the HN report, the Dresden-3 fault tree was run with the SAFTE 
Monte Carlo simulation code. The failure rates given for the components 
were used, but the components were assumed to be non-repairable. Vesely(14) 
also used this fault tree to illustrate the KITT computer codes. Because of 
the amount of cut sets in the fault tree, Vesely based bis calculations on the 
minimal path sets. A KITT-1 run was made with the 8 minimal path sets 
found. The failure rates used were those given in the HN report. Vesely 
also made a KITT-2 run in order to obtain results for the repairable system. 
The components were assumed to have constant repair times, the average 
repair times given in the HN report were used and the standard deviations 
associated with the actual normal repair distributions were ignored. Vesely 
obtained the exact answer by using all inclusion-exclusion terms for the 
minimal path sets . In general, it i s necessary to use all terms in a prob-
ability calculation based on minimal path sets in order to obtain sufficient 
accuracy when the component failure probabilities are small. 
Figures 15-16 show the results of calculations with the UNA programs 
for the same cases as considered by Vesely. In contrast to his calculations, 
the calculations here were based on minimal cut sets , i. e. the 48 minimal 
cut sets of the reduced fault tree. Two inclusion-exclusion terms were 
calculated. The terms provide upper and lower bounds to the exact prob-
abilities. As seen from the figures, the first term alone gives a sufficiently 
accurate answer for most of the time range considered. 
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To facilitate comparison with the results from (1 3) and (14), figure 1 5 
shows a calculation for the non-repairable case with time points corre-
sponding to an integer number of weeks. The results are in good agreement 
with the graphs in (1 3) and (14). 
For the repairable case, the results are given in figure 16 for the time 
points corresponding to those calculated in (14). The results in figure 1 6 
differ slightly in the second decimal point from those in (14). The error is 
presumably due to the small word length in the PDP8 minicomputer 
(mantissa = 24 bits). 
4. NETWORK PROGRAM: TIENET 
For a network with bi- or uni-directional links (components) the program 
calculates all paths between two nodes specified by the user. The paths 
represent the "success" tree of the network. The Dual of this, the fault 
tree, i s written on an output file. The data are acceptable in this form as 
input data for the CUT programs. 
The algorithm used here is identical in principle to that given by 
Kroft(1 9),but the implementation differs. Kroft's algorithm was based on 
a description of the nodes only. We are interested in obtaining the fault 
tree of the system in terms of its representation by minimal cut sets where 
the basic events represent failures of components or nodes, or both. It is 
therefore necessary to use a description of the network in terms of its 
links as well as of its nodes. 
Example 2 in reference 22 is used to illustrate the performance of 
TIENET. The network is shown in figure 1 7. As seen from the figure, all 
links are uni-directional. The component numbers are those given in 22. 
The nodes have been given the numbers shown in the figure. 
The input data file i s shown in figure 18. Each line in the file consists 
of: component number - input node - output node. The component numbers 
in this file are all negative, which signifies that the links are uni-directional. 
Bi-directional links are written with positive component numbers in the 
input data. TIENET then replaces each bi-directional link with its two 
uni-directional equivalents. 
Two internal l ists, a component list and a node list, figure 19, are 
made by TIENET from the input data. Both lists are placed in the same 
one-dimensional array. The component list is a list of component descrip-
tions arranged according to component number. Each component descrip-
tion contains: component number - input node - output node. In the node 
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list each node is described in terms of the next components that can be 
reached from it by a flow originating in the node. Each node description 
consists of: a pointer L to the first element in the next node description -
node number - N, the total number of succeeding component pointers - an 
element with a pointer (IPREV) to the previous node encountered in the 
instant path search - a pointer (IFLAG) pointing towards one of the succeeding 
component pointers, the one representing the component under investigation 
in the instant path search (IFLAG/ 0 indicates that the node has been en-
countered previously in the path search) - and a series of N component 
pointers (each pointer pointing towards the corresponding component 
description in the component list). 
A flowchart of the search algorithm used in TIENET i s given in figure 
20. The algorithm searches out all paths between the start node and the 
end node, avoiding paths with loops. 
The output file from TIENET is shown in figure 2 ! . If the output-file 
i s subjected to a "cut set" calculation by the CUT programs the minimal 
cut sets of the network are found and written out in standard form, figure 22. 
If the file is subjected to a "tie set" calculation, the minimal path sets of 
the network are written out, figure 23. The expanded minimal cut and path 
sets are identical to those found in (22). 
As a second example we use the network given in figure 1 of reference 
20. It is reproduced here in figure 24. The input data file i s shown in 
figure 25. 
Figure 26 shows three runs of TIENET for the paths between nodes 1 
and 8; one for nodes only, one for components only, and one for both nodes 
and components. When the three output files are used as inputs to the CUT 
programs, the results in figures 27 - 29 are obtained. The minimal cut 
sets for components only are identical to those found in (20). The number 
of minimal cut sets differs in the three cases because of the difference in 
vulnerability of the network to node failures and to link failures. 
The number of minimal path sets i s , of course, the same in the three 
cases . The only difference l ies in the way in which they are specified. 
The path sets for components only are shown in figure 30. 
- 18 -
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2 53 54 
2 521847 
218461057 
2 51 50 
2 56 57 
218431044 
2 48 49 
2 471842 
210401841 
2 45 46 
2 441039 
210381855 




2 4ø 41 
218201833 




2 30 31 
2 181015 
210091829 
2 32 33 




2 38 39 
2 27 28 
2 25 26 
218201821 
2 21 22 
2 23 24 
210181054 






2 8 9 




2 14 15 
2 121005 
210031004 
2 5 6 
210011002 
2 2 4 
2 1 2 
f 
Fif. 1. lapot data for tl» DrMdw-3 feult trøt. 
CHECK OF INPUT DATA FOR DRESD3 (PR I USD 
SATE I960 OCCURS ON LEF1 SIDE RUT NOT ON RIGHT 
MO OF DIFFERENT OR - GATES • 53 
NO OF DIFFERENT AND - GATES * 7 
TOTAL NO OF DIFFERENT 















































































































































































Wig, 2. TREECH output for 















































































3 fault trøø. 
CHECK OF INR0T DATA FOR DRESDJ ( DUI^ L > 
GATE 18C0 OCCURS ON LEFT SIDE PUT NOT ON RIGHT 
NO OF DIFFERENT OR - GATES » 7 
NO OF DIFFERENT AND - GATES * 53 
TOTAL NO OF DIFFERENT GATES > 































































































































I M S 
188« i 
1887 J 
















I 2 1 
I 2 1 
t 4 1 
l 2 1 
t * 1 
i % t 
l 4 1 
l 5 2 
l C 1 
l 7 1 
l 7 1 
l 2 1 
l » 1 
L 18 2 
l 11 1 
l 11 1 
t 2 1 
l 13 1 
L 2 2 
L 2 1 
l 4 1 
l 2 1 






































1 2 1 
1 S 2 
1 7 1 
1 2 1 
1 13 1 
1 2 1 
1 7 1 
1 2 1 
2 19 1 
1 2 1 
l 4 1 
l 2 1 
1 2 1 
1 7 1 
1 2 1 
* 19 1 
• 1« 1 
t 2 1 
» 19 1 
» 19 1 
L Z 1 
1 21 1 
2 1 
S 17 1 
• 19 1 
L 2 1 
• 28 1 
> 21 1 
L 2 1 
l 23 1 
t 11 1 
> 13 2 
S 13 1 
1 19 2 
» 19 1 




i t « . S. T R U C K output for O M OWU øf tht DrøøéøN-l feult trø«. 
- 24 -





/ >N N /-/\-\ 
1045 1053 1055 1057 
• • 
/ /\ \ /—/\ \ 
1042 1044 1051 1052 
• • •• • 
/ — / \ — S /-/\-\ /-/\-\ /-/\-\ 
47 1042 48 49 1050 5? 5« 57 
• • 
/ /\ \ / /\ S 
1040 1041 1048 104? 
• • • + 
/ - / S — \ /-/\-S /-/\-\ /~/\-\ 
44 1039 45 46 52 1047 53 54 
• • 
/-/\-\ /-/N-N 
1038 1055 1046 1057 
• + 
/-/S-S /-/S-\ 
42 43 51 50 
Flf. *• Drøødm-3 fault tr«*. 
- 25 -

















\ /-/\-N /-/\-\ 
1030 23 24 36 37 
1837 
/-/S-\ 
1633 1025 1036 






























































PI*. 4. Or«*d«n-3 fault tr««. 
- 26 -
















































Fif. 4. Orøødøa-3 fault \x—. 
- 27 
R CUTSET 
CUTSET OR TIESET CUTSET 
CUTSET OF: 
FILE DSK»: DRESt-3 
SYSTEM DRESl>i 
HIGHEST ORDER MANTEO * 999 
TOP GATE 




































RESULT OF DftESDj 
REDUCED CUTSET 







SETS OF ORDER 
SETS OF ORDER 
SETS OF ORDER 























Fif. & Teletype output during calculation of minimal cut eela of the 
Draadan-3 fault tree. 



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Result HI« for th9 Dresden-) fault tr99. 
- 29 -
R CUTSET 
CUTSET OP TIESET TIESET 
TIESET OF DSK 
FILE C'SKt DRESP3 
SVSTEH: DRESD3 
HIGHEST ORDER WANTED = 999 
TOP GATE 








RESULT OF DRESD2 
REDUCED TIESET 
4 SETS OF ORDER 2 















































































































































































































Fig. 7. Tolotjrpo oatpat owing catcalaMon of 
minimal path oota of tao Prwdaa - t fea't trot. 































+ie : r 
+ 1041 









































4 21 22 
4 25 26 
ii9iiie?4 
5 99 101 
4 167 10S 
216201019 
6 130 S3 













5 69 70 
5 72 74 
210151016 
61019 5 
3 12 15 
6 77 79 












6 61 €2 
6 65 €6 
210441645 
2 5? 60 
210401641 
» 122 134 
4 125 126 
210421942 







7 39 40 
7 44 45 
216491050 
7 49 50 
7 54 55 
210511652 
216471048 









7 144 146 
101671 142 











































































































































Wig. 9. Input data for tb« HPØ fault trta. 
- 31 -
CHECK OF INPUT CAT* FOR : HPIS (PRIHAL) 
GATE 1888 OCCURS ON LEFT SIDE BUT NOT ON RI6HT 
NO OF DIFFERENT OR - GATES » 49 
NO OF DIFFERENT AND - GATES - 19 
TOTAL NO OF DIFFERENT 6ATES « 68 

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































Fig, 10. TREECH output for the HPI8 teott tr«8. 
i M f f f K H H t t l SiS t ssHiKiiHiiiuMuumtsiSHiaHSBKHnHBsnKKHKiiHiiHHi s 
ww ww w S w t * « * w * • 8 — 
I 
r 





1 M 0 
1 M 1 
1 M 2 
1 M 3 
1 M 4 
I M S 
I M C 
1 M 7 
1 M 8 





































































































































































































Hf. f I. TRCECH output for th« DIM! of th« HPB fault tr««. 
- 34 -
R CUTSET 
CUTSET OR TIESET CUTSET 
CUTSET OF 
FILE DSK»: HPIS 
SVSTEH: HPIS 
HIGHEST ORDER MANTED > 999 










RESULT OF HPIS 
REDUCED CUTSET: 
1 SETS OF ORDER 1 
•3. SETS OF ORDER 2 
8 SETS OF ORDER 3 
52. 
EVALUATED CUTSET: 
29 SETS OF ORDER 1 
400 SETS OF ORDER 2 
r?se. SETS OF ORDER 2 
31T9 
Fig. 12. Taletypa output during calculation of minimal cut acta of tha 
HPIS fault tree. 
- 35 -




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































f i f . t i . Result fil« tor tb« HPB fault t rm. 
- 37 -
r*£-
5 1 i'> 
~ " T A * »•> 
— - - A ^ * - * -
" 1 2 ? 009 •» ••• 
4 3 :• ? A * 1 4> 
*F I 2 1 0 0 T"-4 
T" • 3 M 5 
.*.: 2 1 !ø 
S 2 2 9 ø«9 4* 
? • 3 • 2 9 0« * 4:-. 
1*.3- 2- l 5 




15 ,3 , 
1€ 3 








25 . 3 
2€ 2 
27-2 
2 6 2 
29 2 
:e-3 
















2 5 -S 
2 1 5 
2 ? 00? 4 } 
2- * Øø?-48 
2, 1 - * 
2 5 -S 




2 - 1 0 " 
2 10 200 
2 1 5 
2 - l ø 2 
2 5 . S 
2 9 009 48 
2 9 009 4* 
£ 1 -5 
2 -5 S 
2 - l ø 3 
2 5 S 
2 l ø .2 
2 5 * 
2 5 i 
2 0 5 . « 
2. 10 . ; 
M 70 
2 l ø JØ 
2 5 S 
2 l ø 3 
2-5 8 
2 - 1 0 2 
2 1 5 
2 9 øø9 4? 
4fc. 2 2 ? 009 4?. 
47. 3 2 1 . 5-
4 3 . 2 - 2 5 •* 
4 9 . 2 - 2 . 1 0 3 
5ø. 2. 2 -5 's 
51 3 2 10 -3 
5 2 - 2 - 2 . 1 -5 
53. 3 2 « øø«. 4* 
54 .3 - 2. 9 0 * 3 . * * 
55. 2, 2 1 . 5 
5«. 2 . 2 . 5 . 5 
57 2. 2 - l ø 2 
0 
Plc. 14. Failara data for tba comaonanta of tlia Oraatfan-3 ayatøm. 
- 3o -
UNAVAILABILITY CALCULATION FOR FAULT TREE: 
CALCULATION BASED ON CUTSET 
DRESD3 




















































































































Fig. I S. Unavailability of the Dresden-3 system. 
Two inclusion-exclusion terms. 
Non-repairable case. 
UNAVAILABILITY CALCULATION FOR FAULT TREE 
CALCULATION BASED ON CUTSET 
DRES03 
































Fig. 16, Unavailability of the Dresden-3 system. Repairable case. 




16 - • 
Pig. 17. Unl-directional network (Uken from reference 22) uaed to 
iUuatrate the TIENET program. 
NBBEX2 
-1 .26,21 
-2 . 26, 21 
-2,26/22 




- 8 , 2 3 , 2 4 









Fig. 18. Input data file to TIENET. Data correspond* to the network 




















































ITHIS s O 
NEXT:START NODE 
Look up node 
description for 
NEXT in node list 
found at IPT 
create reference 
to previous node 
IPREV r ITHIS 
ITHIS = IPT 















NEXT : node under con-
sideration 




back in lists 
Look up node 
description 
at IPT 
IFLAG : 0 IPT : ITHIS 
ITWS : IPREV 
finish! 
connect all 
paths as a 
tree 




















































































































































































































































































Fig. 21. Output file from TIENET. The data correspond« to the network 
in fig. 17. 
- 43 -
R CUTSET 
CUTSET OK TIESET CUTSET 
CUTSET OF 
FILE DSKO: P20T2? 
SVSTEH NB8EX2 
HIGHEST ORDER WANTED « 999 
TOP SATE: 





















RESULT OF NBBEX2 
REDUCED CUTSET 
3. SETS OF ORDER 3 
3. SETS OF ORDER 4 
2 SETS OF ORDER S 
8 
EVALUATED CUTSET 
5 SETS OF ORDER 3 
3 SETS OF ORDER 4 
2 SETS OF ORDER 5 
18 












































Fig. 22. Minimal cut aeta for the network In fig, 17. 
- 44 -
- 45 -
Fig. 24. Bi-directional network (taken from reference 20) uaed to 
illuatrate the TIENET program. 








16, 5- 6 
17,6,8 
16,3,5 
19- 5- 7 
e 




OUTPUT MOOES-COMPONENTS OB BOTH- WOOES 
NETWRK FILE 
FILE OSM JBF1G1 
CALCULATE PATHS FROM HOT« 1 
TO NOOE 8 
OUTPUT ON 
FILE OSKf HWTerS 
R TIENET 
NETWORK PATHS 
OUTPUT MOOES, COMPONENTS OR BOTH? COMPONENTS 
NETNRK FILE 
FILE DSK* JBFIG1 
CALCULATE PATHS FROM MODE 1 
TO NOOE 8 
OUTPUT ON 
FILE OSK* C01T08 
R TIENET 
NETWORK PATHS 
QUTPUT MOOES, COMPONENTS OR BOTH? BOTH 
NETWRK FILE 
FILE DSK* JBFIG1 
CALCULATE PATHS FROM NODE 1 
TO NOOE 8 
OUTPUT ON 
FILE DSKR B*lTeS 
CUTSET 
R CUTSET 
CUTSET Oft TIESET 
CUTSET OF 
FILE frSK* N M I W 
SYSTEM: JBFI61 
HIGHEST ORDER WANTED - 999 
TOP GATE: 








RESULT OF JBFI61 
REDUCED CUTSET: 
1 SETS OF ORDER 
3 SETS OF ORDER 
EVALUATED CUTSET: 
2. SETS OF 




EVALUATE COMPLEX EVENTS 
TVPE EVfcl OH 
CUTSET OF JBFIS1 
Fig. 26. Teletype output during- three runs of 
TIENET for the network in Of. 24. 
Fif. 27. Minimal cut acts of the network in 
Ag. 24. Node* only. 
- 47 -
R CUTSET 
CUTSET Olt TIESET CUTSET 
CUTSET OF: 
FILE DSKt. cenes 
SVSTEH JBFIG1 
HIGHEST ORDER WANTED « 999 
TOP 6ATE: 








RESULT OF JBFIG1 
REDUCED CUTSET 
2 SETS OF 
2 SETS OF 
2 SETS OF 
6. 
EVALUATED CUTSET 
4 SETS OF 
8 SETS OF 









































































Fig. 28. Minimal cut set« of the network in tig. 24. Componenu only. 
- 48 -
R CUTSET 
CUTSET OR TJFSET; CUTSET 
CUTStT OF: 
FILE DSK»: 8811*? 
SVSTEN. JBFIG1 
HIGHEST ORDER WANTED • 999 
TOP GATE: 








RESULT OF JBFIG1 
REDUCED CUTSET: 
i SETS OF ORDER 1 
9. SETS OF ORDER 2 
4 SETS OF ORDER 3 
















































































































































































































Fig. 29. Minimal cut aet« of the network in fig. 24. Node« and components. 
- 4S -
R CUTSET 
CUTSET OR TIESET: TIESET 
TIESET OF: 
PILE DSK»: C01T03 
SVSTEH: JBFIG1 
HIGHEST ORDER WANTED » 999 
TOP GATE: 







RESULT OF JBFIG1 
REDUCED TIESET. 
1. SETS OF ORDER 2 
3. SETS OF ORDER 3 
3. SETS OF ORDER • 
7. 
EVALUATED TIESET: 
5. SETS OF ORDER 4 
2. SETS OF ORDER 6 
7. 
R CUTEV 
EVALUATE COHPLEX EVENTS 
TYPE EVAL C-A 



































Fig. 30. Minimal path aata of tha natworic in fig. 24. Component« only. 
